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Playing and the affective time-spaces of a Bristol primary school 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I have two objectives. The first is to critically explore definitions of 
playing that have underpinned a great deal of research in children’s geography. 
In so doing I want to highlight some of the assumptions that various authors 
within geography have made (often implicitly) about the ontological status of 
playing. This will in turn, lead me to work with, between and sometimes against 
three authors who have tried to theorize playing. In following this route, I hope to 
come to some tentative conclusions about the status of playing, which 
paradoxically will eschew any (strong) ontological commitment at all. This leads 
to my second objective, which is to explore four particular aspects of playing – 
embodiment, affect, objects and time-space – to examine how they are 
interleaved with spaces and spacing. In necessarily situating this work within my 
research at Hilltop Primary School [1] in the summer of 2001, I hope to show that 
geographical studies can contribute to definitions of playing as much as playing 
can inflect certain notions of space. 
 
Keywords: playing, school, affect, embodiment, time-space, non-representational 
theory. 
 
Child’s Play? 
 
In thinking about children and playing, it was a while before I realized that the two 
terms seem to coagulate together, and this seemed to happen without much 
comment. For instance, the first thing you see when picking up a copy of 
children’s geographies (Holloway & Valentine, 2000) is children playing on the 
cover. Many authors have contributed to the establishment of this link through 
the very focus of their studies. This includes a number of articles which have 
been concerned with the provision and use of (often outdoor) play facilities, (see 
Valentine & McKendrick, 1997; Built Environment, 1999). Other studies, closely 
aligned with my own research here, have explored the actual practices of playing 
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in after-school clubs (Smith & Barker, 2000), public playgrounds (Gagen, 2000), 
commercial leisure spaces (McKendrick et al, 2000) and third world rural 
contexts (Punch, 2000). Indeed, my own research and this paper were based 
upon and continue to reinforce this subtle connection between playing and 
childhood. 
 
This common move to link playing and childhood contains a number of tacit 
agreements, which I would like to bring into the foreground. Firstly it presupposes 
the connection between playing and childhood to be self evident, which is to say, 
there is something called „child‟s play‟, often thought of as separate from the ludic 
activity of adults. James et al (1998) suggest that „the culture of childhood might 
be seen in the linguistic and playgrounds games of children, a collective culture, 
enduring and separated off from the adult world‟ (p.99). I believe that the self-
evidence of this connection is something that could usefully be investigated and 
challenged, and part of my focus here will be to gesture towards ways in which 
this might be done. My working hypothesis will be that certain statements about 
playing should be applicable to all people, rather than just limited to young 
people. It is therefore crucial to my mind that any theorization of playing, such as 
the one I hope to elaborate in this paper, must account for an activity which is 
done by people of all ages. Such an argument seeks to obliquely engage with 
recent work in children‟s geography, which has been debating the differences 
and connections between adults and children (Philo, 2003; Jones, 2003), and the 
blurred boundary between adulthood and childhood (Valentine, 2003). 
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The second tacit agreement that underpins the studies mentioned earlier, is that 
play is talked about only in so far as it has the potential to be liberating, usually in 
respect to children‟s use of space. For example, Smith & Barker (2000) recount 
how children negotiate play activities at an after-school club in order to re-gain 
some degree of control over that particular aspect of their lives. In a similar vein, 
Punch (2000) explores how children in rural Bolivia „create their own playspaces 
away from parental control‟ (p.56). McKendrick et al (2000) interpret the growth 
of commercial play spaces as asserting „children‟s right to play space in parts of 
the built environment which were hitherto perceived as almost exclusively adult 
domains‟ (p.101). Aitken (2001) uses play to elaborate upon children‟s rights to 
justice and a politics of difference. My argument here is that although playing 
(often when it resists commercialization), can be key to young people‟s abilities 
to secure rights to and control over space, this is only telling half the story. As we 
see in Gagen‟s (2000) study of gender normalization in 19th century American 
playgrounds, playing was not, and is not, separate from sedimented regimes of 
power-discourse. Or put another way, playing isn‟t all fun and games. 
  
To extend this point further, my third observation on the coalescence of 
childhood and playing is that authors who have written about playing, to varying 
degrees, assume that their readers know what playing is. Indeed, it almost 
seems stupid to raise this question. After all, we all know what playing is … don‟t 
we? It is this assumption, key to many if not all studies of play, that I particularly 
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want to work on in order to disrupt a little the processes by which playing is 
quietly becoming packaged in the ways described in the previous paragraph. In 
order to enact this disruption, I begin by exploring three approaches, each of 
which offers a different way – through psychoanalysis, discourse analysis and 
performance studies - of defining play. Using the various insights of these three 
approaches, I wish to theorize certain aspects of play more fully, in order to upset 
certain assumptions about playing. 
 
Transition Play 
 
The first approach I wish to address is the work of psychoanalyst and 
psychotherapist Donald Winnicott (1971), which has greatly influenced the work 
of Stuart Aitken, the author who has done most to explore playing within 
(children‟s) geography. Winnicott, like myself, is concerned with „the lack of a 
useful statement on the subject of play‟ (1971, p.39). The appeal of his work 
(particularly to geographers) as he attempts to address precisely this concern, is 
the way in which he explicitly links playing with space. Simply put, „playing has a 
place and a time‟ (p.41; original emphasis). The context of Winnicott‟s study is 
his work in psychotherapy, and he uses play specifically in order to elucidate his 
notion of transitional space, where a child develops a sense of self/other through 
playing. I should state clearly that my focus here is not on the broader arguments 
made by Winnicott. I am only interested in those parts of his work, which either 
directly or indirectly provide the basis or support for his definition of play. To this 
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end, I read Winnicott as making three other useful statements about what play is, 
in addition to situating it in time and space. Firstly, he foregrounds the role and 
importance of objects and object relations in playing performances. „[P]lay … is 
always on the theoretical line between the subjective and that which is objectively 
perceived‟ (p.50). Secondly, he calls attention to the creative role that playing can 
fulfill, or in his words, „playing is an experience, always a creative experience‟ 
(p.50). Finally, he acknowledges the practical extent of playing, or in his words 
the fact that „playing is doing‟ (p.41) Amanda Bingley (2003) provides one 
example of the way in which these ideas can be used, in her case to explore the 
relationship between landscape and self. 
 
However, despite critically accentuating context, objects, creativity and the 
practice of playing, there are some limitations to Winnicott‟s work when trying to 
define playing. His definition of playing is often restrictive, such that in suggesting 
that playing is doing, Winnicott contrasts this „doing‟ with thinking and wishing, 
which is to say that he does not consider things such as day-dreaming as a form 
of play. He also maintains that playing is always creative, where creativity is 
defined as an ability to shape external reality rather than be subjected to it. 
Subsequent work by Judith Butler, refracted through Gagen‟s (2000) study of 
American playgrounds, has shown that playing can be as much a process for 
subjection as for creativity, to use Winnicott‟s own terms. Finally, although 
accentuating the role of objects, Winnicott‟s is still unwilling to cede any agency 
to objects themselves. As Kingsbury (2003) shows with the example of a couch 
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acting in the capacity of a mother and pillows which stand for breasts, objects 
only achieve agency on an Imaginary level, rather than being treated as agents 
in their own right, i.e. pillows acting in their capacity as pillows (c.f. Latour, 1993).  
 
Underlying all of these criticisms, there is perhaps a more significant problem 
with the theory of play we encounter in Winnicott‟s scholarship. His definition 
becomes too bounded by his context, which is to say, his work provides a 
definition of playing as developmental. Winnicott‟s focus of course, is entirely 
practical, and his use of play is secondary to its uses in psychotherapy. However, 
in Playing and Reality, Winnicott suggests that „there is a direct development 
from transitional phenomena to playing, and from playing to shared playing, and 
from this to cultural experiences‟ (1971, p.40). Playing is explicitly defined as a 
developmental activity, whether done by children or adults. Brian Sutton-Smith 
(1997) terms this a rhetoric of play-as-progress. Playing is conceptualized as an 
activity which helps people grow intellectually, and/or develop a sense of self. 
Winnicott‟s definition of playing, implicitly defines children and adults in 
psychotherapy as less-than-adult, a definition geographers have been keen to 
move beyond (Holloway & Valentine, 2000). When faced with the challenge of 
articulating what playing might look like in a non-therapeutic environment, 
Winnicott‟s response, literally „whatever I say about children playing really applies 
to adults as well‟ (p.40), deflects, rather than answers the question. 
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Let me pause for a moment to clarify my argument. I am not arguing that playing 
is not an important part of the development process (to the extent that we are 
always „developing‟ and this is understood in a non-teleological manner much 
more akin to emergence) [2]. However, I am suggesting that definitions of playing 
cannot be reduced to processes of development which are effects of certain 
forms of playing, (and not playing itself). Perhaps Brian Sutton-Smith expresses 
this idea more eloquently when he says 
 
A play theory of any comprehensiveness must grasp this strange 
companionship of the very young and the very old, the first waiting to 
begin and the second to finish; … and such a theory must account also for 
the invigorated play of soldiers waiting for battle, or the intensive play of 
Boccaccio‟s youthful fourteenth century folk attempting to outlast the Black 
Plague. In all these cases play seems to have more to do with waiting 
than with preparing, more to do with boredom than with rehearsal, more to 
do with keeping up one‟s spirits than with depression (1997, p.48). 
 
With these criticisms in mind, I wish to turn now to Stuart Aitken‟s work to 
examine how he as incorporated Winnicott‟s insights. Aitken is keen to explore 
the potential for playing to transform the relations of social reproduction, and is 
careful to jettison much of the developmental rhetoric that surrounds Winnicott‟s 
definition of play. For Aitken only certain forms of playing have the potential to 
enact this social transformation. He suggests that „play … does not fit well in the 
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rational, instrumental logic that pervades the abstract conceived spaces of 
today‟s world‟ (p.180) [3]. Hence, „[P]lay, at its most radical and important, is as a 
form of resistance‟ (2001, p.180). This ideal type of play, according to Aitken, is 
both non-commercial and done in private (thick play). This leads to his claim that 
„giving young people space is more than giving them room to play, it is giving 
them the opportunity for unchallenged and critical reflection on experiences‟ 
(p.180). While, as Thomas (2002) opines, it may be difficult to locate such private 
spaces for play, Aitken effectively highlights the critical and ethical potential of 
play. In this scenario, play is most clearly defined as „the active exploration of 
individual and social imaginaries, built up in the spaces of everyday life‟ (p.176). 
However, I want to suggest that many playing performances have far more 
contingent and diverse contexts and outcomes. This is not to work against the 
tenor of Aitken‟s work, but to suggest that there are many other avenues which 
might be traveled. Hence, in trying to disrupt this conceptual ghettoization of 
playing a little, I turn now to the work of play theorist Brian Sutton-Smith (1997), 
which has also tried to account for many different approaches to play. 
 
Rhetorics of Play 
 
Sutton-Smith‟s book, The Ambiguity of Play, is based on the premise that „when 
it comes to making theoretical statements about what play is … there is little 
agreement among us, and much ambiguity‟ (1997, p.1). Therefore, rather than 
beginning with a definition of play, Sutton-Smith adopts a more genealogical 
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approach by proceeding to examine several different rhetorics of play, the 
culturally situated discourses that underlie different theories of play. In his third 
chapter he turns his attentions to the rhetoric of child‟s play as progress, 
exemplified in Winnicott‟s work. However, his prognosis is bleak. While never 
rejecting the play-as-progress discourse outright, Sutton-Smith states that 
„evidence does not seem to support very clear causal relationships‟ (1997, p.42) 
between playing and development, where correlation is often mistaken for 
causation. He then goes on to suggest that „the progress rhetoric appears to 
serve adult needs rather than the needs of children‟ (Ibid), by facilitating adults‟ 
intervention and manipulation of children‟s (playful) lives. 
 
Sutton-Smith also explores two other discourses of play specifically in relation to 
children. The first of these investigations examines power and identity in the play 
of children, and he suggests that  
 
The adult public transcript is to make children progress, the adult private 
transcript is to deny their sexual and aggressive impulses; the child public 
transcript is to be successful as family members and schoolchildren, and 
their private or hidden transcript is their play life, in which they can express 
both their special identity and their resentment at being a captive 
population (1997, p.123). 
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However, while some playing performances are a result of this „resentment‟, the 
link between playing and some authentic, special or private identity ignores the 
extent to which playing is part of everyday life, and not some discrete block of 
experience. That is another way of saying that identities are not fixed, and nor is 
there some core or „special‟ identity, which certain (playing) practices can 
produce outside relations of power (c.f. Aitken, 2001).  
 
Sutton-Smith also examines the phantasmagorical rhetoric of playing, which 
explores the potential of imaginary play by children. This chapter offers a number 
of important nuances for theorizing playing, not least that playing has the 
potential to be both rational and/or irrational. Sutton-Smith also points out that 
„the adult imaginary rhetoric when applied to children tends to overemphasize the 
creative and innovative qualities of their play at the expense of both the 
contraries, the phantasmagorical and the ritualistic‟ (p.171). His point is that 
playing is „rooted in ritual as much as in innovation‟ (Ibid. c.f. Gagen, 2000), and 
that this applies as much for adult play as it does for child‟s play. 
 
Once Sutton-Smith has covered the different rhetorics of play, he (re)turns his 
attentions in a final chapter that is somewhat at odds with the rest of the book, to 
articulating a definition of play (again) which incorporates all of these rhetorics. 
His clearest and most unequivocal statement defines „play as a facsimilization of 
the struggle for survival‟, where „the primary motive of the players is the stylized 
performance of existential themes that mimic or mock the uncertainties and risks 
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of survival‟ (1997, p.231). In this conclusion, not only is his account biologically 
deterministic, but, as he himself admits, „despite my extensive criticism of the 
rhetoric of progress, I have now invented yet another form of it‟ (Ibid). While 
being a very useful theoretical resource for anyone interested in playing, Sutton-
Smith‟s book in the end fails to provide a more nuanced theory of playing than 
those he writes about and critiques. Perhaps the primary reason for this is that 
his study begins with discourse, ignoring the fact that playing is, irreducibly, a 
practice. It is these lived, experiential aspects of play that are constantly 
exceeding the confines of discourse, which finds no real place in his thesis. 
However, it is precisely this aspect that we have to address, if we are to nuance 
our understandings and discussions of playing, and so I turn now to a third 
approach to defining play. 
 
Playing Performances 
 
As any person who plays knows, there is always part of that practice which 
cannot be described directly. Something elusive, embodied at both a physical 
and emotional level. While the task of writing about that which exceeds 
representation may at first seem impossible, the discipline of Performance 
Studies, with its focus on embodiment and emotion can provide valuable 
theoretical resources for incorporating practices into our accounts [4]. Richard 
Schechner in particular, has developed a very intriguing theory of play. 
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Schechner (1993) begins his discussion of play by stating his preference for a 
concept of playing, as opposed to play: „a continuous bending, twisting, and 
looping of … that for which I can find no appropriate name, so “action” will have 
to do‟ (p.39, ellipsis in original). There are a number of important points to unpack 
in such a short definition. Firstly, Schechner is keen to suggest that there is no 
discrete event called play, as such, but rather a far more fluid and polymorphous 
process called playing. This emphasis on playing as a process is an important 
shift from fixed to more fluid notions of practice. However, I would argue that it 
still confines playing to one temporal rhythm, that of continuity. If events operate 
at a number of different rhythms and are far more mobile and permeable than 
Schechner‟s allows for, then playing becomes something which can occur across 
multiple temporalities and rhythms. That is to say, playing can sometimes be a 
continuous, bending, looping twisting „action‟, but on other occasions it can also 
have a very abrupt beginning and/or end. As Winnicott said, playing has a time 
and a place, and it is important to recognize that both place and time can vary. In 
fact Schechner too is aware of this and suggests that: „if one needs a metaphor 
to localize and (temporarily) stabilize playing … “Net” is better: a porous, flexible 
gatherer; a three-dimensional, dynamic, flow-through container‟ (1993, p.41). 
While this metaphor promotes, in my reading, fluidity over stability, it still 
encompasses a sense of context which is dynamic, which is to say it allows for 
playing performances to occur across different temporal rhythms and spatial 
formations, (if one can imagine a net that can become as rigid as a cage).  
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However, what Schechner‟s net metaphor perhaps doesn‟t incorporate is the 
potential for playing to be creative in regards to time and space. That is to say, a 
net is still a container of sorts, whereas many geographers have already 
highlighted the potential for playing to create time and space, as well as take 
place in it (e.g. Punch, 2000; Aitken, 2001). While I fully support the recognition 
of the creative potential of playing, which we have already noted in Winnicott‟s 
definition, I do not wish to exaggerate this potential. As Gagen (2000) adeptly 
shows us, playing can more often than not be used to reinforce existing spatio-
temporal relations and sediment existing power relations. Indeed, we might infer 
from Gagen‟s engagement with Judith Butler, that just as most gender 
performances are enacted to stabilize gender norms, many playing performances 
also work to normalize playing spaces (and times). However, as Butler notes in 
regards to gender, these performances never achieve the ideal. Hence it is 
important to consider to what extent actual playing performances live up to the 
norm, and to what extent they refuse and exceed it. In practice, creativity is 
particularly slippery to grasp, as some of my playing performance examples 
show later in the paper. More often than not the spatio-temporal creativity of 
playing created fleeting time-spaces, which were subsumed into other time-
spaces as quickly as they were created. 
 
To return to Schechner‟s description of playing as an „action‟, the second point to 
note is that it is very vague. In fact, it hardly tells us anything at all about what 
playing is. However, rather than immediately dismissing such a description as 
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relatively useless, I want to entertain the notion that Schechner in fact wishes to 
eschew any (strong) ontological base for playing. That is to say, when confronted 
with the question, what is playing, rather than (attempt to) answer it, Schechner‟s 
definition destabilizes the very question itself. In thinking about „bending, twisting 
and looping‟, I am suggesting that playing has more to do with becoming rather 
than being. Playing has no identity (being) itself, except as a secondary 
characteristic of its conceptual differentiation (becoming) – the identity of 
difference. We can see this identity in difference, (or the becoming of playing) in 
Sutton-Smith‟s discussion of rhetorics of play, all of which are about playing, but 
none of which (either on there own or cumulatively) can provide a definitive 
statement about what play is. This is why, in my reading, Schechner describes 
playing as „action‟, because it is only in the performance of playing, when it is 
enacted in a particular space-time (the being of becoming), that we can actually 
define playing (fleetingly). If playing does have an identity (an ontological base), it 
is a weak and unstable one, at every moment prone to another becoming (or 
becoming-other, see Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, esp. chapter 10). Schechner 
elaborates on this when he asserts, 
 
We need to stop looking so hard at play, or play genres, and investigate 
playing, the ongoing, underlying process of off-balancing, loosening, 
bending, twisting, reconfiguring, and transforming - the permeating, 
eruptive/disruptive energy and mood below, behind and to the side of 
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focused attention. (Why not „above‟? I really don‟t know, it‟s probably just 
cultural prejudice) (p43). 
  
Let me pause for a moment to briefly summarize and slightly extend this 
argument, since it is crucial to the understanding of playing I wish to pursue in 
the rest of this paper. In reading Schechner, I am suggesting that playing occurs 
at the intersection of being and becoming. It has no identity (being), except as a 
secondary characteristic of its ontological difference (becoming). Therefore, we 
must shift our attention away from pursuing playing in its being, or in other words, 
trying to offer some kind of definition of what playing is, and instead investigate 
playing in its becoming. However, this is a self defeating enterprise, since any 
attempt to „pin down‟ difference, will necessarily impose an identity on this 
difference, thus transforming the becoming into a being once again. Therefore, 
we must work at the intersection of being and becoming, and try to write 
alongside playing as difference, without trying to inhabit it. This requires, as 
Schechner notes, a focus on the situated „action‟ or performances of playing, 
which returns us once again to the intersection of representation and that which 
exceeds it with which we began this section. 
 
So what can we say about the performance of playing. I have already highlighted 
the potential of Schechner‟s vague definition for destabilizing the ontological 
base of playing. I have also discussed the importance of a temporal and spatial 
context, or „net‟ as Schechner would have it, to discussions of playing. We can 
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say that this „net‟ functions as a marker of the being/becoming intersection of 
playing, which is why any discussion of playing must always fold into a particular 
space-time. However, Schechner‟s vague definition also has its limitations when 
it comes to writing alongside the becoming of playing, or in other words providing 
us with something more concrete to work with than just „action‟. Hence, it is this 
term „action‟ that I wish to unpack, to provide a more sustained account of what 
goes into each performance of playing, or each being that accompanies the 
becoming of playing. Therefore, rather than define playing as such, I wish to 
theorize certain aspects of play more fully within the loose definitional context I 
have outlined above. In using the term theorizing, I have in mind a process more 
akin to a conversation than a question and answer session, where conclusions 
are eschewed in favour of continued (theoretical and empirical) discussions in 
the future. In order to theorize playing, as I have argued above, it is necessary to 
explore some of my own playing performances in Hilltop Primary School (see 
note [1]), Bristol in the summer of 2001.  
 
The research which I will draw on, involved conducting a performance 
ethnography in an inner-city primary school (5-11 years old) with just over 300 
pupils. My performance ethnography involved, in a peculiar form, going back to 
school. Arriving at 8:30am, when most of the children did, and leaving at 3:30pm, 
I followed the routine of various classes as they went about their daily business. 
However, unlike them, I spent each day focusing my attention on anything that 
felt like playing. And felt here is significant, because performance ethnography 
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aims to use all the senses, rather than just the verbal or visual. In order to record 
and share these experiences, I made a research diary, in which I tried to evoke 
the various playing moments as I experienced them. In writing these moments, 
my aim was not to re-present them as such, but rather in trying to evoke them, 
gesture towards what did not make it on the page. I also want to use these 
empirical vignettes as concrete examples of playing, in order to explore the role 
of embodiment, affect, objects and time-space in playing performances. 
 
Embodied Playing 
 
After registration, Mrs R. [5] begins a lesson on spelling. The reception 
class are all sat cross-legged on the blue carpet facing the whiteboard. 
They are somewhat restless, due to the heavy rain outside the window. 
Mrs R. says a word, then chooses someone to write the spelling on the 
whiteboard. While this is going on, a boy is constantly pulling the back of 
my chair, levering himself up to get a better view. I notice another boy at 
the back of the classroom trying to squash himself into a cupboard. „Who 
can spell d-o-c-t-o-r?‟ asks Mrs R. Immediately a flurry of hands dart up 
into the air. A few mute cries of „me, me‟ are whispered. A girl is chosen. 
She gives a quick triumphant glance at the boy next to her, before 
standing up and writing the word correctly on the board. When she returns 
to her place, the boy next to her sticks his tongue out. He then keeps 
poking her in the ribs, until she lets out a cry. Mrs R., who has been 
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discretely monitoring this, sends the boy to the red carpet. The boy looks 
longingly over at the rest of the class for a while, before playing with an 
envelope as if it were a glove. Back on the blue carpet, the boy who was 
trying to squash himself into a cupboard is now playing with a toy truck 
(Research Diary – Reception Class, July 2001). 
 
The first thing that anyone will notice when doing research on playing, just as I 
did on my first day at Hilltop (described above), is that all playing performances 
are embodied. That is to say playing involves sights, sounds, smells, touch and 
tastes to varying degrees. This is hardly a revelation and there is also now a vast 
literature on embodiment within geography, which Aitken (2001) deftly channels 
into his discussion of children‟s bodies in his chapter on „Learning through the 
body‟. However, in many of the accounts Aitken discusses, and also in many of 
the accounts of playing that I have reviewed so far in this paper, part of the 
materiality of bodies is omitted from the picture. Alan Radley (1995) puts it nicely 
when he states,  
 
The confusion lies in the equation of the epistemological determination of 
social life as discursive with the ontological status of the body; or put 
another way, the refusal to acknowledge as different that which cannot 
readily be put into words. There is good reason, therefore, to distinguish 
the discursive form of society from the social constructivist perspective. 
Once this is done, it becomes possible to consider an alternative 
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standpoint, one that does not deny that the body has been subjected to 
controls within power/discourse, but takes a different perspective on that 
process (p21; emphasis in original). 
 
In other words, while bodies do signify such things as gender, race, age and 
ability, which have very important material consequences, the materiality of 
bodies also exceeds representation (See Foucault, 1998). It is particularly 
important to consider the consequences of this excess in relation to our 
epistemological practices. As Geraldine Pratt puts it, „our actual research 
performances, the now of research, goes largely un(re)marked, even though they 
clearly exceed the written trace‟ (2000, p.650; original emphasis). In thinking and 
writing about the embodied nature of playing therefore, we must be attentive not 
only to the body-as-signifier, but also to the ways in which the representationally 
excessive aspects of corporeality work. This is particularly important because, as 
I will gesture towards later, it is often what is in excess of signification that comes 
to fore in many (but not all) playing performances [6]. 
 
Playing with affects 
 
After morning break, the science lesson begins. The pupils sit in groups of 
six, which I find out later have been allocated according to ability. On each 
table, the girls sit on one side and the boys on the other. There is a list of 
tasks to be completed, written on the board, since different people have 
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completed different things. I am sitting at a table in the middle of the 
classroom. Although there is talking, the pupils seem to be working 
diligently, whilst the teacher moves around helping those who are 
struggling. After a while, the boy sitting diagonally behind me, turns 
around and gently hits the girl sitting next to me on the back. She 
immediately suspects him (he has a reputation of being class joker), and 
tells him not to do it, without saying it so loud that the teacher hears. I 
keep an eye on him now, and he soon turns around again, gives me a 
complicit glance and gently hits her again. The girl turns and confronts him, 
and in his defense he blames the boy sitting next to him. A short argument 
with his neighbor follows, before he begins to (not so gently) hit his 
neighbor as punishment for supposedly hitting the girl. All the time this is 
happening, the girl is watching, and all three are smiling (Research Diary – 
Year 4 class, July 2001). 
 
In the above account there are a number of examples of ways in which bodies 
represent certain processes (the gendered spatial formation of the classroom for 
instance). However, in offering this moment from my research, I wish to address 
the challenge of finding ways of talking about the playing performance (or „action‟) 
that my research diary cannot represent. I have already suggested in the 
previous section that in part, the materiality or physicality of a body exceeds 
representation. Now I want to look at how the emotional aspects of a body are 
also non-representable. I think this is important, because it is precisely these 
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aspects that many people value in their playing experiences. A number of 
theorists from a diverse range of disciplinary backgrounds have also begun to 
address similar questions, and the name they have given to this embodied 
representational excess is affect. As Brian Massumi points outs, 
 
Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion. But one of the 
clearest lessons … is that emotion and affect – if affect is intensity – follow 
different logics and pertain to different orders. An emotion is a subjective 
content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is 
from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, 
the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into 
semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable 
action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned 
and recognized (Massumi, 2002, p.27-8). 
 
So if affect exceeds representation, and it is not emotion, then how exactly do we 
think and write about it? Building on his previous point, where „affect is intensity‟, 
Massumi suggests 
 
The realm of intensity … is transcendental in the sense that it is not 
directly accessible to experience, it is not transcendent, it is not exactly 
outside experience either. It is immanent to it – always in it but not of it. 
Intensity and experience accompany one another, like two mutually 
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presupposing dimensions, or like two sides of a coin. Intensity is 
immanent to matter and events, to mind and body and to every level of 
bifurcation composing them and which they compose. Thus it also cannot 
but be experienced, in effect – in proliferations of levels of organization it 
ceaselessly gives rise to, generates and regenerates, at every suspended 
moment (2002, p.33) [7]. 
 
This is to say that affect can be gauged in its effects. William Connolly, in his 
latest book Neuropolitics, explores this link between emotion and intensity further. 
In the following statement, he provides some concrete ways of thinking about the 
products of affect. 
 
Part of the affective energy mixed into thought becomes available to 
consciousness as feelings and concept-imbued emotions; but other 
thought imbued energies find symptomatic expression in the timbre of our 
voices, the calmness or intensity of our gestures, our facial expressions, 
the flush of our faces, the rate of our heartbeats, the receptivity, tightness, 
or sweatiness of our skin, and the relaxation or turmoil in our guts 
(Connolly, 2002, p.76). 
 
The „complicit glance‟ of the boy in the Year 4 class is one way in which affect 
could be gauged, as could the way in which he hit both the girl and the other boy 
without hurting them (much). The subtly of this gesture – the way in which he hit 
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them only so hard – was not something I cognitively recognized, but rather „felt‟. 
It is important to note that in my discussion so far affect could be reduced to the 
level of personal feelings and emotions. However, Massumi (2002) is quick to 
point to the contrary that affect „is not ownable or recognizable‟ (p.28), but 
„inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored 
perspective‟ (p.35; original emphasis). 
 
Hence, affect can be thought of as flowing between bodies and is thus inter-
subjective, or better still a-subjective, since it „escapes‟ actually existing structure 
things. We have probably all at some stage experienced the rather cliché „wave 
of fear‟ or „mummer of delight‟ when in a crowd situation, which are both „the 
capture and closure‟ or the result of a particular affect or intensity. In my playing 
moment during the Year 4 Science lesson, we could say that a mischievously 
joyful affect (briefly) flowed through the children and me. None of us „owned‟ this 
feeling, nor was it located „in‟ any of us. Yet it was crucial to our enactment of 
that particular moment. 
 
To briefly summarize, I am arguing that any definition of playing or embodiment 
that does not consider affect, ignores a vital part of what allows us to get on with 
our daily lives. Indeed, in weaving together scholarship on brain research, 
cinema, politics and culture, Connolly (2002) argues that affect is as important to 
thinking and judgement, as it is to feelings. But even beyond this, I am arguing 
that it is vital to consider affect because in many (but not all) playing 
 24 
performances, it is the affective register that becomes heightened. Playing is not 
thoughtless as such, but rather in many instances, prioritizes non-cognitive 
(physical and emotional) processes, such as the playing moment in Year 4 
Science. However, it is important to remember that these processes are 
themselves not altogether separate from cognitive thinking. Hence, while authors 
such as Aitken & Herman (1997) suggest that playing „counters rationality‟, I 
would suggest instead that many (but not all) playing performances, rather than 
countering rationality, allow a greater role for the non-cognitive (and therefore 
seemingly irrational) parts of the brain (Connolly, 2002) [8]. 
 
Playing with different bodies 
 
„My pencil case is called Gibbles. And my rubbers also got a name. 
Gidney. He‟s cross and he‟s got big sharp teeth‟ (Girl, aged 9). „Gidney‟, 
an object invested with emotions, is then passed around the table as the 
young people argue somewhat fiercely over who will hold him. The girl 
who „owns‟ the rubber has the final say in what he can and cannot do 
(Research Diary – Year 4 class, July 2001). 
 
It is at this juncture, as I move on to this next research moment, that I want to 
reopen the case file on the role of objects in playing mentioned earlier. I want to 
begin by considering the impact of this moment, in which objects are vital to the 
playing performance, to what I have so far said about theorizing playing. I have 
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suggested that affects, since they are asubjective, exceed even a broad 
definition of what we regard as human [9]. Indeed Deleuze & Guattari maintain 
that 
 
[A]ffects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any 
lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as 
he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound 
of percepts and affects (1994, p.164). 
 
So affects can flow through objects just as they flow through humans. However, I 
have also suggested that playing is an embodied experience. Therefore, if we 
are to take seriously the role of non-humans in playing performances, then we 
need a reworked notion of embodiment, as far as this is understood in human 
terms. In order to address this challenge I wish to turn to the work of Gilles 
Deleuze. 
 
Deleuze presents us with a very different conception of the body from the 
implicitly human body which I have been referring to thus far. Following Spinoza, 
Deleuze (1988) defines the individuality of a body in two ways: firstly by the 
relations of motion and rest, and secondly by its capacity for affecting and being 
affected. It is important to consider carefully exactly what Deleuze is getting at 
here. Firstly, both of these definitions are dynamic. Bodies never have stable 
identities, but rather are always prone to other becomings. [10] Thus, according 
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to Deleuze, even stasis is viewed as a form of relative motion [11]. While Gibbles 
and Gidney were a pencil case and rubber when I first encountered them, they 
quickly became animated beings, and in this text perhaps they are now a hybrid 
of the two. Secondly, both of these definitions are relational. Therefore, 
somewhat paradoxically, a body‟s individuality is never as an individual. That is 
to say that because bodies, as I have just noted, are always more or less mobile, 
then they are never entirely separable from other bodies. In fact, Deleuze argues 
that „a body, however small it may be, is composed of an infinite number of 
particles [other bodies]‟ (1988, p.123) [12]. Although difficult to actually perceive 
in the playing moment, Gibbles and Gidney were constructed by other physical 
bodies (e.g. hands, the desk), and social bodies (the discussion that took place, 
broader ideas about the use of rubbers). We might think of the individuality of the 
body then as its being, or a temporary representation that the body nevertheless 
eludes (again) in its becoming-other. Perhaps thinking of the body‟s individuality 
as a trace or wraith, gives a better sense of what I mean when I describe 
individuality as partial. Thirdly, the role of affect is highlighted as key in defining 
bodies. The arguments over Gidney give some idea of the ways in which bodies 
can modify and be modified by the affective charge of a situation, creating an 
aggressive playing environment in this situation. I mention the role of affect not 
only to re-iterate that it is asubjective (i.e. belongs to no body in particular), but 
also to restate that affect is woven into thinking and judgement (Connolly, 2002), 
and hence the capacity for affecting and being affected can involve a wide variety 
of cognitive as well as sensual apparatus. While the arguments over Gidney 
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were passionate, they were also to a certain extent logical – the „owner‟ always 
having the final „say‟. 
 
The importance of the above discussion to my thesis is expressed far more 
concisely by Deleuze when he states, „a body can be anything; it can be an 
animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social 
body, a collectivity‟ (Deleuze, 1988, p.127). Thus, Deleuze‟s ontology of „the 
body‟ is an opening up, which incorporates the non-human („an animal‟), the non-
material („a body of sounds‟), the non-representable („an idea‟) and multiplicities 
(„a social body‟). Deleuzian bodies are at once material, semiotic, social and 
incorporeal, as indeed bodies are when encountered in our everyday (playful) 
lives. I also note that for Deleuze, all bodies are conceptually equal, and thus his 
definition shies away from using the human/non-human definitional pairing, which 
still has human at its core. It is for these reasons that I wish to use a Deleuzian 
notion of bodies when thinking about playing. As I have suggested above, 
playing is irreducibly an embodied activity. To ignore the contingent role that 
objects, sounds, ideas and socio-cultural habits have on playing performances is 
to ignore the specificity and complexity of these performances (or to ignore the 
becoming of playing). The bodies of „Gibbles‟ and „Gidney‟ are as vital to the 
playing performance I just mentioned, as any of the „human‟ bodies present. In 
fact, this diary extract doesn‟t even mention the school building, the curriculum, 
the class rules or a host of other bodies that co-constituted playing in this 
particular context. Thus, I argue that a Deleuzian inspired notion of em-bodi-ment 
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allows a much broader consideration of what (or which bodies) co-constitute 
different playing performances. 
 
Playing with/in time-space 
 
As I outlined when discussing Schechner‟s work, a consideration of space-times 
enfolded into various playing performances is vital to theorizing playing. Such a 
consideration is particularly important because playing has the potential to create 
new spaces. Playing performances erupted everywhere while I was at Hilltop, 
and confining my study to the playground would have been totally insufficient. In 
this respect, my research resonates with Punch‟s (2000) account of children‟s 
playing experiences. Having said that, a great number of the playing 
performances I witnessed did occur in the playground. The point I am making is 
that while some playing practices can be spatially fluid and creative, other 
performances most definitely aren‟t, and serve to normalize tightly defined (and 
policed) spaces of play.  
 
The same is true when thinking about playing temporally, which was brought 
sharply into focus at the end of one break time. The year 5 class that I had joined 
that day continued to argue and „muck about‟ for a good 10 minutes after the 
official end of break time, and this continued as they climbed the stairs and sat 
down for lessons. However, the year 4 class I had joined the previous week left 
the playground very promptly in an „orderly‟ line. Reducing playing to a tightly 
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demarcated spatio-temporal practice would be as insufficient as only stressing its 
fluidity and porosity. Neither account allows for the different spatial and temporal 
patterns and rhythms of playing, which always occurs between the two 
conceptual limit cases (fixed/static) which are only conceived after the event.  
 
Playing with conclusions 
 
So let me summarize now the main points I have made about playing. Firstly I 
have suggested that playing occurs at the intersection of being and becoming, 
which is to say that playing doesn‟t have a stable identity as such. It is only in 
specific time-space contexts that playing acquires a specific form, (the much 
cited work of Opie and Opie (1969) provides a comprehensive overview of many 
„forms‟ of playing), and function (and this is where I see Winnicott‟s work fitting in). 
However, as Sutton-Smith‟s (1997) study shows, any attempt to define playing in 
its being, using either its form or function, will be theoretically limited. I am 
suggesting that if we are to theorize playing, then we must work to incorporate its 
becoming into our accounts, or what Schechner describes as „action‟. I then 
elaborated on Schechner‟s term „action‟, by suggesting that playing in its 
becoming is always embodied, using Deleuze‟s philosophy to vastly expand the 
terrain of what counts as a body and thus what contributes to different playing 
performances. I have also drawn attention to affect, since it is not only a key 
aspect in many playing performances, but also remains largely unremarked upon 
in our research accounts. I am not suggesting however, that the ways in which 
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various bodies signify (certain identities) are not also constitutive of playing 
performances, merely that affect plays an important, and so far overlooked role in 
embodied playing. However, I do not wish to suggest that by incorporating the 
insights of a range of non-representational theories we will suddenly have the 
anecdote to overcoming partial and situated accounts. While I am offering an 
expansion of the terrain on which we work upon, this terrain will still always have 
gaps and fissures (Rose, 1997). Finally, I have suggested that playing is both 
constitutive of and performed within a range of space-times. While playing has 
the potential to be(come) spatially and temporally creative, I have warned against 
easy identifications between playing and spatial (and temporal) autonomy, 
suggesting instead that many playing performances in fact can act to normalize 
spaces and bodies. 
 
Following this discussion, I would like to draw a few tentative conclusions around 
playing. Firstly, in theorising playing, I would suggest we must be modest. All 
attempts to give a definition have so far failed because they always partake of 
exclusions which are empirically contradicted. This was brought home to me 
when I saw a girl sitting quietly reading in the corner of the Hilltop playground one 
lunch-time. Her playing was not energetic, irrational, or opposed to „work‟ [13], 
and the form of embodiment it took was closer to rest than motion. It is because 
of moments like this that I want to leave playing a conceptually open category. I 
urge modesty because I do not wish colonize the becoming of playing (again), 
and hence I refrain from saying anything more than „action‟. It does not follow 
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though, that such modesty leaves us empirically high and dry. As I suggested at 
the beginning of this paper, we all know what playing is, which is to say there will 
always be a spatially, temporally and culturally situated being of playing‟s 
becoming, and each becoming builds on or departs from sedimented notions of 
what playing is. Hence there can be no one theory of playing as such, just 
theorizations that are themselves always differential relations of movement and 
rest, akin to an open-ended conversation.  
 
Secondly, the Deleuzian notion of bodies that I have introduced, and the 
reworked notion of embodiment that it demands, recognizes that we humans are 
only a small part of the world and the way it works. With regards to my discussion 
of playing, this is another way of saying that playing is not (just) kids stuff. This is 
not to deny that children play a great deal, nor to suggest that studies of children 
playing should be de-legitimized. I simply wish to make the point that in thinking 
and writing about playing, we must realize that even in child-centered studies, 
there are a great many more bodies playing than just the young people involved. 
(I‟m thinking once again of Gidney‟s playing performance). In the course of this 
paper, my theorization of playing certainly applies to me as much as the children 
involved. Playing is something we all do, albeit to different extents and degrees, 
and this is something that needs a great deal more investigation [14]. Certainly 
the next time I think of studying children and playing, maybe I‟ll pause a little 
longer to interrogate the effects that this „and‟ between playing and children has 
on the directions I focus my critical attention.  
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Thirdly, there are significant methodological implications that derive from the 
approach to playing I have outlined in this paper. For my research I used 
performance ethnography as a method for investigating playing. I choose this 
method because in thinking through playing, I would argue in order to understand 
it, you have to actually do it. However, in discussing such experiences it is 
necessary to exercise caution. Firstly, in playing with children, my discussion 
(both empirical and theoretical), is based on relational knowledges. That is to say, 
in my discussion of the playing performances in this paper, I have not really been 
talking about the playing of my research participants. On the other hand, I have 
not been talking about my playing experiences either. The playing that 
contextualizes this paper occurred between my participants and me. It is in this 
sense that I think we can talk with young people, where talking with them means 
talking about the relation between us (during research) without reducing them to 
this relation. In this sense, I would agree with Philo (2003) that there are (albeit 
precarious) connections between the worlds of adults and children. I would 
suggest that rather than knowing „their‟ world, we can instead know something 
about this betweenness that we both share. What occurs between adults and 
children is inevitably inflected by unequal relations of power, but it is, irreducibly, 
a shared space. The ethical task then becomes, how do we create and live in 
such spaces, which Aitken (2001) has begun to explore. The second 
methodological implication is that the re-presentation of those performances in 
this paper (i.e. the research diary extracts) are themselves poor catalysts for 
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thought and feeling. That is to say, that although I have tried to evoke the 
performances with words (in an attempt to engage affect), any effort to „capture‟ 
affect is destined to fail. Therefore, I can only hope that the affects these words 
generate might be similar to those I experienced with the young people at Hilltop 
during my research. Such a statement also functions as a challenge for future 
research, to explore different methods and what other things they can tell us 
about playing and spacing. 
 
My final conclusion is that playing isn‟t necessarily emancipatory. Recalling the 
year 4 boys playing football every lunchtime, playing in this instance seemed to 
have more to do with performing sedimented (and gender inflected) playing 
practices than challenging these norms. In using playing as an important 
category with which to understand children‟s lives, I am arguing that current 
approaches often only deal with half the story, largely ignoring the ways in which 
playing is often about conformity and socializing to an imaginary norm. The 
liberating potential of playing performances is thus always determined in the 
contingency of the encounter. Any politics based on playing therefore relies on a 
narrow and precarious base. I would suggest that such a politics, therefore, can 
do no more than modestly admit this, and look to disciplines and techniques 
which might aid in re-enacting this potential as extensively as possible (Connolly, 
2002). 
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Notes 
 
[1] This is a pseudonym, used as part of a confidentiality agreement signed with 
the school. 
[2] I am thinking particularly of the work of Keith Ansell Pearson (1997, 1999, 
2002), and his explorations of this concept in relation to the philosophy of 
Nietzsche, Deleuze and Bergson. 
[3] I am not sure I entirely agree with this assessment. As Thrift (2000a) among 
others has shown, playing performances can be precisely the type of 
activity which contemporary capitalism colonizes in its efforts to increase 
workers productivity. 
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[4] Readers may also wish to consult recent work on non-representational 
geographies (Thrift 1996, 2000b; Dewsbury et al. 2002), which drawing 
heavily on Performance Studies could provide similar resources. Indeed, 
Thrift could very well have had playing in mind when he talks about 
practice as „unwritable, unsayable, and unstable. And that is its fascination; 
it is a living demonstration of the skills we have but cannot ever articulate 
fully in the linguistic domain‟ (2000b, p.235). 
[5] Mrs R. is a pseudonym for the reception teacher, used as part of the 
confidentiality agreement I signed with the school. 
[6] An example of a playing performance which was not primarily based on what 
exceeds representation is the drawing one boy, aged 7, did of a board 
game, itself a wonderful attempt to evoke the more affective elements of 
playing. 
[7] I am reminded here once again of Schechner‟s injunction to work with the „the 
permeating, eruptive/disruptive energy and mood below, behind and to the 
side of focused attention‟. 
[8] It should be noted that for Connolly, thinking is a product of the 
brain/body/culture network, „a complex, layered activity, with each layer 
contributing something to the ensemble of dissonant relays and feedback 
loops between numerous centers. These loops include many different 
bodily sites sending signals about the state of the body to the brain‟ (2002, 
p.10). Hence thinking involves the interplay of cognitive, sensual and 
affective faculties while being irreducible to any of these distinctions. 
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[9] Note that Massumi (2002) suggests affect escapes „actually existing, structure 
things‟. This is to say, that it is not just the non-human, but even the non-
organic that can affect and be affected in turn, a point I return to later in 
relation to Deleuze‟s definition of a body. See also Marks (2002), esp. 
chapters 11 and 12. 
[10] Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish (1977) demonstrates, among other things, 
the great lengths that are required to maintain (discipline) a body in a 
particular state. 
[11] Dewsbury (2000) illustrates this point well: Think of a building. Although you 
may think of it as a permanent structure, it is falling down, just very slowly 
(hopefully!)  
[12] Bruno Latour (2002) provides a fantastic illustration of this idea in relation to 
the sociology of Tarde. 
[13] Indeed, I would argue that the division between work and play is constantly 
susceptible to metamorphosis. Sometimes playing is barely (if at all) 
discernable from work (such as this girl reading in the playground), while 
at other times a strict partition between the two will be enacted. Most of 
the time the relationship between playing and working will be far more 
complex and difficult to disentangle - such is the nature of practice. 
[14] Common wisdom dictates that children play more than adults, and Jones 
(2003) argument, that children‟s lives are more immediately structured by 
emotion, would seem to add weight to this assertion. However, I am 
 37 
unwilling to come to any conclusions on this matter, if only because of the 
paucity of studies of adults‟ playing.  
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